BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//events.la.psu.edu//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20201101T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=11;BYDAY=1SU END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20200308T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=2SU END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:13561-5d7cb80c18bbfb1824d226ebfbf3a993@events.la.psu.edu DTSTAMP:20260608T002441Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250128T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250128T170000 SUMMARY:“Taste for Risk: Elite Risk Preferences in Developing Country Democracie s” with Vineeta Yadav DESCRIPTION:\nHow do politicians make risky choices? What shapes their t aste for political risk? Do their risk preferences influence their polit ical and policy choices? These are the questions we address in this pape r. While two recent studies of MPs in four rich\, established democracie s find their MPs are not expected utility maximizing (EUT) rational acto rs\, there are no studies of risky decision-making by politicians in dev eloping countries. In this paper\, we provide the first such study. We h ypothesize that differences in personal experience with parliament and d ictatorship should lead to systematic differences in politicians’ risk p references within countries creating distinct national risk distribution s. We test these predictions by administering an experimental decision t ask to parliamentary candidates in India\, a stable democracy\, and Paki stan which last transitioned to democracy in 2008. We find that parliame ntary experience makes politicians more risk loving while autocratic exp erience makes Pakistani politicians more risk averse\; politicians devia te from both EUT and prospect theory in both countries. Strikingly while Indians are overwhelmingly risk loving\, Pakistanis are highly risk ave rse. Finally\, we present evidence that shows that individual risk prefe rences predict which politicians are perennial party hoppers and which o nes are loyal partisans.\n\nFor more details: https://events.la.psu.edu/ event/sass-vineeta-yadav/ X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:

How do politici ans make risky choices? What shapes their taste for political risk? Do t heir risk preferences influence their political and policy choices? Thes e are the questions we address in this paper. While two recent studies o f MPs in four rich, established democracies find their MPs are not expec ted utility maximizing (EUT) rational actors, there are no studies of ri sky decision-making by politicians in developing countries. In this pape r, we provide the first such study. We hypothesize that differences in p ersonal experience with parliament and dictatorship should lead to syste matic differences in politicians’ risk preferences within countries crea ting distinct national risk distributions. We test these predictions by administering an experimental decision task to parliamentary candidates in India, a stable democracy, and Pakistan which last transitioned to de mocracy in 2008. We find that parliamentary experience makes politicians more risk loving while autocratic experience makes Pakistani politician s more risk averse; politicians deviate from both EUT and prospect theor y in both countries. Strikingly while Indians are overwhelmingly risk lo ving, Pakistanis are highly risk averse. Finally, we present evidence th at shows that individual risk preferences predict which politicians are perennial party hoppers and which ones are loyal partisans.

For mo re details: https://events.la.psu.edu/event/sass-vineeta-yadav/

LOCATION:101 Old Botany Building END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR